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itself from gold, in effect trying to export its unem-
ployment. But it became evident that not every-
body can have a weak currency at the same time.
A major lesson from the 1930s is that one of the
roles of the multilateral system is to prevent futile
beggar-thy-neighbour depreciation.
Two years have passed since the high point of the
financial crisis in September 2008. It would seem
the same chain of events is being set in motion,
with the same time lag. This reading is however too
simplistic. As Avent (2010) has observed, the cur-
rent situation is not one of ‘war’ between coun-
tries. Rather, countries face different challenges
and policies carried out to achieve domestic eco-
nomic goals differ. This in turn directly or indirectly
impacts other countries through exchange rate
developments. But exchange rate movements can
be, and in some important respects are, part of an
appropriate response to the asymmetric charac-
ter of the current challenges.
Indeed, whereas the Great Recession of 2008-09
was mostly a common shock affecting all major
countries simultaneously, its aftermath has been
highly asymmetric. Major asymmetries are seen
between advanced and emerging/developing
economies. Advanced countries are still strug-
gling with the fallout from the financial crisis, but
emerging and developing economies are again
thriving. However, neither the advanced nor the
emerging country groups are homogenous. For
example, in the US damage to the supply-side
seems to be limited, but private demand contin-
ues to be dented by the extent of household lever-
age. In Europe pessimism about the supply-side
prevails, while private demand has on average
been hit to a lesser degree than in the US.
The existence of asymmetries does not rule out
the possibility of beggar-thy-neighbour
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WHILE EMERGING COUNTRIESrecover reasonably
quickly from the crisis, the recovery in advanced
countries has been unspectacular, and unem-
ployment has risen significantly, especially in the
United States and the crisis-affected European
countries. The US, the country with largest current-
account deficit, continues to stimulate its econ-
omy using monetary tools, weakening the US
dollar and all currencies that are tied to the US
dollar. As a by-product of US monetary policy, cap-
ital flows to emerging countries with open capital
accounts have accelerated, pushing up their
currencies. This is thought to threaten economic
recovery in emerging economies and has resulted
in various actions to limit appreciation. Japan and
Switzerland have also intervened in the foreign-
exchange market, while the UK’s quantitative
easing has a downward pressure on sterling. But
not all currencies can be weak at the same time.
In this context, this Policy Contribution aims to:
• Clarify the currency war(s) debate and to
assess its significance;
• Discuss the motives behind national policy
responses;
• Assess the implications for the euro area.
1 CURRENCY WARS: HOW SIGNIFICANT?
1.1 The issue
In October 2010, Brazil's finance minister Guido
Mantega captured the spirit of the time when he
spoke of currency war. The expression is reminis-
cent of the 1930s, when the major currencies
relinquished the Gold Standard in an uncoordi-
nated way. Then, it took two years after the crash,
from October 1929 to September 1931, for Britain
to sever sterling’s link to gold and set in motion a
currency war. One country after another detachedcompetitive depreciations in the context of weak
global demand. But it does imply that divergences
in policy approaches and the corresponding
exchange-rate movements cannot by themselves
be taken as signs of non-cooperative behaviour.
We will continue to speak of ‘currency war’,
because this is the commonly used expression in
this debate, but we want to point out from the
outset that the expression can be misleading.
1.2 Policy measures impacting currency
movements
When discussing the 'currency war', it is important
to distinguish three main issues:
• The decade-long dispute over the management
of currencies pegged to the US dollar, first and
foremost the Chinese renminbi, but also the
currencies of other exporters of manufactured
goods and oil producers;
• Recent attempts by a number of floating
exchange-rate countries to depreciate their
currencies or at least to resist appreciation;
• Unconventional monetary policy measures,
such as the announcement by the US Federal
Reserve of a new programme of asset pur-
chases (known as QE2 – quantitative easing
2) which may impact on the exchange rate of
the US dollar vis-à-vis all floating currencies,
including the euro and other European
currencies.
The first of these issues, the US-China exchange
rate debate, dates back at least to the middle of
the last decade. The issue is if China’s exchange-
rate policy amounts to a subsidy for its export
sector. China has maintained a peg to the US dollar,
except for a period from 2005 to 2008 when China
allowed its currency to rise 17 percent against the
dollar, but this nominal appreciation seems very
limited against the background of rapid economic
catching-up. China has accumulated and contin-
ues to accumulate huge foreign-exchange
reserves. These developments suggest that the
Chinese real exchange rate is indeed undervalued.
We will not expand on the issue here because it
has been extensively studied elsewhere, but it
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should be noted that China’s exchange-rate policy
is relevant for the broader currency war debate in
three important respects. First, China is a signifi-
cant player in the world economy and its policy
strongly affects the pace and magnitude of the
required global rebalancing that the IMF (2010b)
has called for. Second, China’s exchange-rate
policy has major implications for the policies of
other emerging and developing countries; as long
as the renminbi does not appreciate, other coun-
tries do not want their currencies to appreciate
either. Third, the bilateral China-US relationship is
particularly sensitive and there is a risk that the
tense discussion over exchange rates at some
point spills over into the trade field.
The second issue – measures to counter appreci-
ation – concerns a large number of countries.
Table 1 lists various kind of recent (mostly
between August and October 2010) attempts to
slow down currency appreciation, including actual
interventions, suspected interventions and oral
interventions. The fact that 20 countries are
included in the table indicates that recent
attempts to depreciate home currencies have
been widespread.
Table 1: Recently adopted policy measures to
resist currency appreciation or favour deprecia-
tion in countries with a flexible exchange-rate
regime
Type of intervention Country
Intervention
Argentina, Colombia, Egypt,
Indonesia, Israel, Japan,
Peru, Poland, Romania,
Russia, South Korea, Switzer-
land, Ukraine
Intervention fears Brazil, Chile, Thailand
Intervention talk India
Suspected intervention Philippines, Taiwan
Adjustment in reserve
requirements
Turkey
Source: Adapted from Kaminska (2010).
Note: Australia was included in Kaminska (2010) as a country
that has intervened in the foreign-exchange market, but the
intervention by the Reserve Bank of Australia in May 2010
aimed at strengthening the currency and we have therefore
excluded this case. Most measures were introduced between
August and October 2010. Countries with pegged currencies,
such as China, are not included.04
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Intervention is only one way for countries to limit
the impact of capital inflows. Increasingly, gov-
ernments also rely on an array of capital-control
measures (Table 2).
The third issue – unconventional monetary policy
measures– came to the fore after the announce-
ment in November 2010 by the Federal Open
Market Committee of a $600bn asset-purchase
programme (QE2). This was widely seen in Europe
and in the emerging world as an attempt to depre-
ciate the US dollar. It prompted a series of nega-
tive reactions from senior policymakers in Europe,
China and several emerging countries. Although
Bernanke (2010) emphasises that “the best way
to continue to deliver the strong economic funda-
mentals that underpin the value of the dollar, as
well as to support the global recovery, is through
policies that lead to a resumption of robust
growth”, the Fed’s policy continues to be disputed.
This raises the question of how to determine when
a monetary policy conducted in a floating
exchange-rate regime context can be considered
‘beggar-thy-neighbour’. While the current empha-
sis is on the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England
and the Bank of Japan have also adopted similar
measures in the past year (Table 3). The European
Central Bank’s purchase of periphery euro-area
sovereign bonds is primarily aimed at improving
the liquidity of these particular government bond
markets and is deliberately sterilised, so it cannot
be regarded as a way to stimulate the economy.
1.3 Exchange rate developments
With this background in mind, we now turn to
assessment. How significant are recent exchange
rate movements? To shed light on this, we scruti-
nise exchange rate developments from a medium-
term (1995-2010) perspective. The most
reasonable benchmark for assessing the value of
a currency is a comparison to its equilibrium
value. Unfortunately, methods for calculating equi-
librium exchange rates all suffer from weaknesses
and lead to largely diverse results: for example,
Table 2: Examples of capital controls and
related measures
Country Measures taken or considered
Brazil
Two increases in October of the financial
operations tax (IOF) applicable to
incoming foreign investment in fixed-
income instruments and funds. 
Increased tax on margin deposits for
derivative contracts of non-residents,
aimed at reducing the profitability and
volumes of foreign-exchange contracts.
Indonesia
Announcements by the government of a
minimum holding period for central
bank bills.
South Africa
Reserve accumulation, loosening of
exchange controls for capital outflows
of residents and raising of the maxi-
mum investment authorised overseas.
South Korea
Bill submitted by South Korean lawmak-
ers in November to impose a 14 percent
withholding tax on interest income on
bonds bought by foreign investors as
well as a 20 percent capital-gains tax.
Auditing of banks handling foreign
derivative contacts.
Specific measures announced in July to
mitigate the volatility of capital flows:
ceilings on FX derivative positions of
banks, regulations on the use of foreign
currency loans, tightening of regulation
on foreign currency liquidity of banks.
Thailand
Introduction of a 15percent withholding
tax in October, applicable to interest
income and capital gains on Thai debt
for foreign investors. Officials have
announced that they are studying the
use of levies to control capital inflows,
but not for short-term use.
Source: IIF, Financial Times, Reuters.
Table 3: Unconventional measures by major
central banks
No expansion
of base
money (quali-
tative easing)
Expansion of
base money
(quantitative
easing)
Purchase of private
assets (credit
easing)
ECB
BoE, BoJ, Fed,
SNB
Purchase of
government bonds
ECB BoE, BoJ, Fed
Purchase of foreign-
currency assets
BoJ, SNB
Source: Adapted and updated from Meier (2009).05
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estimates presented in Evenett (2010) suggest
that the Chinese renminbi’s undervaluation
ranges between zero percent and 50 percent. The
recent estimates by IMF (2010b) for major G20
regions are shown in Table 4.
Table 4 indicates asymmetries. Advanced coun-
tries are estimated to be somewhat overvalued,
while other emerging countries (Russia, South
Africa and Turkey) are substantially overvalued,
Asia is substantially undervalued, and the results
for Latin America vary between models. 
There are also likely asymmetries within each
region. Country-specific data is unfortunately not
available, but, for example, it is likely that the euro
is much more overvalued than the British pound,
or that the Brazilian real is more overvalued than
the Argentine peso. 
Lacking proper and up-to-date country-specific
misalignment estimates, we use in the following
sections the index of the real effective exchange
rate, which measures the change in the inflation-
adjusted exchange rate vis-à-vis the weighted
average of trading partners compared to a base
period.
1.3.1 Medium-term movements
Figure 1 on the next page shows the change in the
real effective exchange rate since January 1995
for the 23 countries listed in Tables 1, 2 and 3, plus
Germany, Australia and New Zealand (three coun-
tries in which there was no intervention aimed at
weakening the currency) and China (which pegs
its currency to the US dollar). The general impres-
sion is that apart from a few exceptions, move-
ments over the past few months have not been
out of the ordinary relative to the trends of the
past 15 years. It is more likely that fears over eco-
nomic growth and unemployment in a less
dynamic global environment make the currency
issue more acute.
Only some countries can justify complaints about
sharp appreciations. For example, India experi-
enced a steady real appreciation (likely reflecting
its economic catching-up) until the collapse of
Lehman Brothers in September 2008, when the
pace of appreciation speeded up. Another exam-
ple is Brazil, which had a rather strong exchange
rate before Lehman’s collapse, and faced a sharp,
but only temporary depreciation after the Lehman
shock and its current real exchange rate is very
high by historical standards. 
‘With a few exceptions, exchange-rate movements over the past few months have not been out
of the ordinary. It is more likely that fears over economic growth and unemployment in a less
dynamic global environment make the currency issue more acute.’
Table 4: G20: Assessment of real effective exchange rate (percent deviation from
medium-term equilibrium valuation)
Macroeconomic balance
approach
Equilibrium real
exchange-rate approach
External sustainability
approach
Advanced 5.6 2.8 5.1
Asia -14.8 -6.6 -12.6
Latin America 8.9 -1.3 4.5
Other 5.8 12.1 15.0
Source: Table 1 from IMF (2010b).
Note: IMF (2010b) indicates that results reported are still a work in progress. Advanced: US, EU, Japan, UK, Canada and Australia);
Asia: China, Korea, Indonesia and India; Latin America: Brazil, Mexico, Argentina; Other: Russia, Turkey and South Africa. The
estimates of ‘under’ or ‘over’ valuation of the REER are based on three approaches used by staff to assess misalignments:
macroeconomic balance, equilibrium real exchange rate and external sustainability. IMF staff does not assess REER for oil
exporters. Unfortunately information is not available about the period to which the misalignment calculations refer to.06
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Figure 1: Real effective exchange rates based on consumer prices (July 2007=100), January 1995
- November 2010
Source: authors' calculations using data from the IMF International Financial Statistics (USD exchange rates and consumer prices),
Datastream (USD exchange rates for periods that are missing from the IMF database), National Statistics of the Taiwan Province
of China (USD exchange rate and consumer price index for Taiwan).
Note: increases in the index indicate real appreciation. The real effective exchange rate is calculated against 143 trading partners,
covering, on average, 98.8 percent of foreign trade. Weights are derived on the basis of Bayoumi, Lee and Jaewoo (2006). The
vertical dashed line indicates September 2008. Consumer prices are available till July 2010 in most cases: we have projected the
consumer prices index till November 2010 by assuming that 12-month inflation rate does not change between the latest available
observation and November 2010. Monthly average exchange rates are used up to October 2010, while the 29 November 2010 rates
are used for November 2010.07
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But there are also countries for which the extent of
currency appreciation does not seem to be wor-
rying when looking at this longer time horizon. For
example, South Korea’s current real exchange rate
level is still well below what it was around 2005,
which leads some observers, especially in Japan,
to claim that Korea’s policy is one of deliberate
depreciation. But Japan’s real exchange rate level
is also not exceptional: even though the Japanese
yen experienced a huge jump from a historically
low level at the time of the Lehman shock, the cur-
rent rate is similar to the average value of about
an eight-year period between 1996 and 2004.
Egypt’s real exchange rate is about 40 percent
above its July 2007 value, but Figure 1 shows that
it also had a historically low value in 2007. Israel’s
real rate is close to its average over the past 15
years. Taiwan and especially Argentina long fol-
lowed a policy of keeping their currencies down
and the crisis has not changed this policy1.
It is also interesting to observe that the Australian
dollar’s current real rate is well above the values
observed in the past 16 years, but despite this
development Australia has not been regarded as
a participant in the recent ‘currency war’.
All in all, our assessment shows that the recent
changes in real effective exchange rates are not
significant enough by themselves to justify speak-
ing about a serious currency war. But they are
substantial enough to bring to the fore the more
fundamental issue of Chinese exchange rate fixity
and capital controls, and those of a few other
emerging countries in the current feeble global
economy, since resumed capital flows to emerg-
ing countries now disproportionately impact some
of those countries that have no or minor restric-
tions on capital inflows.
1.3.2 Advanced versus emerging countries
So far we have computed trade-weighted real
effective exchange rates for individual countries
in relation to 143 other countries of the world. It is
also possible to construct an effective exchange
rate index between two groups of countries.
Gouardo and Pisani-Ferry (2010) construct the
index between two blocs of countries, ‘advanced’
and ‘emerging’. The sample is not comprehensive
but it contains all major countries: it is comprised
of the top 20 countries in terms of total trade
(excluding euro-area countries), plus the euro
area.  In order to ensure a minimal degree of homo-
geneity with respect to the shock of the financial
crisis, the group of advanced countries includes
only western countries plus Japan (countries
such as Singapore, or South Korea thus fall into the
other group)2.
This simple, summary indicator helps to monitor
the evolution of exchange rates between
advanced and emerging economies. The ‘effective
exchange rate of emerging countries against
advanced countries’ is not simply the inverse of
the ‘effective rate of advanced countries vis-à-vis
emerging countries’, due to different weights
(Figure 2), though the two series largely mirror
each other.
Figure 2 shows long real exchange rate swings
between the two major regions. Emerging coun-
tries appreciated until about mid-1997, when a
series of contagious crises (in Asia, Brazil, Russia)
pushed their currencies sharply down. Then they
appreciated again until about 2001, when a new
wave of emerging market crises (originating in
Argentina, Brazil and Turkey) and the depreciation 1. It is also important to
highlight that real exchange
rate appreciation is an
equilibrium phenomenon in
countries that are on a
catching-up economic
growth path. Since most
emerging countries shown
are on such a growth path,
one should have expected a
trend real appreciation, but
this was not the case for
many of these countries.
2.  Advanced countries
(Australia, Canada, Euro
Area, Japan, Switzerland,
Sweden, United States,
United Kingdom) and
emerging countries
(Brazil,  China, Hong Kong,
India, Korea, Malaysia,
Mexico, Poland, Russia,
Saudi Arabia, Thailand,
United Arab Emirates).
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Figure 2: Real effective exchange rates between
emerging countries and advanced countries
(based on consumer prices, July 2007=100),
January 1995 - November 2010
Source: updated and corrected from Gouardo and Pisani-Ferry
(2010). Note: the increase in the index indicates real
appreciation. The vertical dashed line shows September 2008.08
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of the US dollar pushed them down again. The next
rebound lasted until the summer of 2008, when
emerging countries were close to their previous
record high levels; this time the sudden stopping
of capital inflows that followed the collapse of
Lehman Brothers led again to a fall in their
currencies. But the rebound was quite quick, most
likely because previous emerging market crises
had their origins in the unsustainable positions of
certain emerging countries, while the current
crisis has originated in the advanced world. By
summer 2010 the real effective exchange rate
index of the emerging countries was close to the
pre-Lehman level. It has depreciated somewhat
since because of a dollar effect: those emerging
countries that tightly peg their currencies to the
dollar (China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, United Arab
Emirates) have all depreciated vis-à-vis the
advanced countries’ group, while the currencies
of India, Korea, Mexico, Poland and Thailand have
appreciated. While volatility was high during
recent periods, taking again a historical view,
Figure 2 does not suggest that the recent period
was extraordinary. On the contrary, what is
extraordinary is the fact that despite an asym-
metric shock of exceptional magnitude, emerging
countries as a group have not appreciated
markedly in real terms since summer 2007.
This observation does not exclude that from the
point of view of individual countries, pressures to
appreciate are seen as a threat to competitive-
ness and export-led growth. But this signals a col-
lective-action problem within the emerging group
rather than excessive appreciation of the group.
1.3.3 A closer look at the euro
So far we have looked at the real effective
exchange rate of Germany, the largest euro-area
country. The real effective exchange rate of Ger-
many also takes into account intra euro-area trade
and therefore the euro/dollar rate or the effective
external exchange rate of the euro has lesser
impact. But it also makes sense to look at the euro
area as a whole and to analyse the euro’s external
nominal and real exchange rate3.
Let us start with the nominal exchange rate of the
euro against the dollar, which is presented in
Figure 3 along with its purchasing power parity
value4. It is important to notice that the euro-dollar
exchange rate continues to stay well above its
equilibrium value as defined by purchasing power
parity since mid-2003. While the euro area's prob-
lems undoubtedly triggered the depreciation ear-
lier this year, they were in fact just a correction
toward equilibrium. As a consequence, the euro
seems to have been overvalued against the dollar
since about mid-2003.
In tables 1, 2 and 3 we listed 23 countries that can
be considered as having directly or indirectly
participated in the currency war: four advanced
economies (US, Japan, UK and Switzerland) and
19 emerging countries. The left hand panel of
Figure 4 shows long term (1970-2010) bilateral
real exchange rate of the euro area against these
four advanced economies. The right hand panel
3. The importance of any
measure of the real
exchange rate can be
assessed on the basis of
trade/GDP ratios: eg the
importance of the real
effective exchange rate of
Germany against all
countries can be assessed
on the basis of total German
exports and imports, while
the importance of the
external real rate of the euro
can be assessed on the
basis of extra-euro-area
exports and imports of
Germany and other euro-
area countries.
4. Purchasing power parity
is a contentious equilibrium
concept, but still can serve
as a rough benchmark.
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Figure 3: Exchange rate of the euro against the
US dollar and the purchasing power parity (PPP)
conversion rate, 4 Jan 1999 - 29 Nov 2010
Source: daily market rate: ECB; implied PPP conversion rate:
authors’ calculations using data from the IMF World Economic
Outlook October 2010. The PPP conversion rate is available for
each euro-area member state and we have calculated a time-
varying weighted average (considering only those countries
that were member of the euro area in the given year; using given
year shares in aggregate euro-area GDP).
Note: an increase in the index indicates appreciation of the euro.
A fixed-weight average of the PPP conversion rates of the first
12 countries that adopted the euro remains within plus/minus
0.6 percent range around the shown time-varying weighted
average during 2001-10.09
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shows the external real effective exchange rate
against 143 countries (all countries for which
exchange rate and consumer price index data are
available at least for the 1995-2010 period) and
against the 19 floating emerging countries that
participated in the currency war.
The long-term trends and recent levels of bilateral
real exchange rates against the four advanced
countries do not suggest any extraordinary move-
ment that Europe should be concerned about.
Against the US dollar, for example, the euro is at
about the average level of 1990-96 and well below
its summer 2008 peak level. Since July 2007, the
euro has appreciated against the British pound,
but its current level is quite similar to the average
of the past four decades, and the euro has depre-
ciated against both the Japanese yen and the
Swiss franc. 
In real effective terms (right hand panel of Figure
4), the euro is well below its average 2002-08
value. Consider only the 19 floating currency war
emerging countries, the euro’s real value is close
to historical lows.
Consequently, since July 2007 the euro has
gained competitiveness against almost all coun-
tries regarded as having participated in the cur-
rency war (only the British pound has depreciated
against the euro, while the US dollar is practically
at the same level as July 2007). Therefore, the
complaint of euro-area policymakers about the
partial reversal of the euro’s fall since July 2007 is
not well founded.
2 MOTIVES FOR POLICY MEASURES IMPACTING
CURRENCY MOVEMENTS
2.1 The output shock
There is a fundamental asymmetry between
advanced and emerging countries concerning the
impact of the shock on the real economy during
the crisis, and also considering longer term growth
developments. In advanced countries, private
deleveraging remains incomplete while public
deleveraging has barely started, and demand is
set to remain subdued for years to come. But the
developing and emerging countries remain on a
growth track. Figure 5 on the next page presents
the diverging developments by showing GDP,
‘Since July 2007 the euro has gained competitiveness against almost all countries regarded as
having participated in the currency war. Therefore, the complaint of euro-area policymakers
about the partial reversal of the euro’s fall since July 2007 is not well founded.’
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
70 75 80 85 90 95 00 05 10
130
120
110
100
90
80
70
130
120
110
100
90
80
70
92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10
US
UK
Japan
Switzerland
143 countries
19 currency-war emerging countries
Bilateral real exchange rates,
January 1970 – November 2010
Real effective exchange rates,
December 1992 – November 2010
Figure 4: External real exchange rate of the euro (July 2007=100)
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normalised as 2007=100, as seen in October
2007 and in October 2010 in the two main coun-
try groups5and a few selected countries.
Emerging countries were barely hit with the excep-
tion of eastern European emerging countries, such
as Russia. But Brazil, India and China have not
been hit at all.
By contrast, advanced countries have been hit hard
on average and positive examples are rare. Australia
is one positive example, having not suffered too
much from the crisis and having one of the best
growth prospects among advanced economies. This
likely explains its absence from the currency war
dispute despite having a strong currency: instead,
Glenn Stevens, governor of the Reserve Bank of Aus-
tralia, has welcomed a stronger exchange rate (see
Goodman and Zachariahs, 2010).
But most other advanced countries suffered in the
crisis, even though there are quite significant dif-
ferences between the euro area, Japan, the UK
and the US (Figure 6 on the next page). These dif-
ferences warrant different policy responses
(Pisani-Ferry and Posen, 2010):
• First, US GDP declined less and recovered faster
than in the euro area, Japan or the UK – though
it remains early days for a recovery, which
seems to weakening in the US, and perhaps
strengthening in northern continental Europe; 
• Second, US employment declined much more
than European, Japansese and UK employment
and did not start exhibiting feeble signs of
recovery until early 2010. Consequently, the
2008-09 employment decline was exception-
ally deep and prolonged in the US whereas in
Europe (including the UK) and Japan it was not
exceptional; 
• Third, as a result, productivity developments
have been strikingly divergent. Nine quarters
after the start of the recession, GDP per
employee had increased by about 4 percent
(the more appropriate measure of productivity,
GDP per hour, had increased by about 7 per-
cent) in the US whereas it was still below the
initial pre-crisis level in the euro area, Japan
and the UK; 
• Fourth, Japan’s investment was the hardest
5. The compositions of the
advanced and emerging
country groups are identical
to the groups shown in
Figure 3; see footnote 2.
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hit: it fell by 35 percent with major conse-
quences for potential output developments.
There are less pronounced differences in the
US, the UK and the euro area, despite the dif-
ferences in growth rates and financial systems. 
It is not entirely clear why there was a big diver-
gence in employment and therefore productivity
between the US and Europe (where the evolutions
in the euro area and the UK are remarkably simi-
lar). Part of the explanation is that US companies,
which are less constrained by firing restrictions,
traditionally adjust their payrolls faster than
European counterparts. But if this was the only
reason, the evolution in the UK, which also has
what is considered to be a flexible labour market,
should mimic that of the US6. Part has to do with
specific shocks affecting the real estate and
finance sectors, which had grown very large in the
US compared, on average, to Europe. And part
results from the fact that in response to the crisis,
several European governments introduced or
strengthened schemes aimed at encouraging job
preservation, such as the German Kurtzarbeit
(IMF, 2010a); those policies, however, did not
include all countries with limited unemployment
rises, such as the UK. The strength of the post-
recession US productivity boom and the subdued
productivity response in most of continental
Europe remain puzzling (Wilson, 2010).
2.2 Private deleveraging
The strength of domestic demand in the short to
medium run largely depends on the extent to
which private agents will engage in deleveraging.
To assess the comparative situation in the US, the
euro area and the UK, Table 5 on the next page
shows changes in levels of indebtedness from
1999 to 2007, and from 2007 to 2009. The num-
bers seem to tell a clear story.
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Figure 6: Impact of the crisis on GDP, employment, hourly output and non-residential investment in
the euro area, Japan, the UK and the US (% movement per quarter from pre-recession output peak)
Source: updated and extended from Pisani-Ferry and Posen (2010) using data from OECD and Datastream. Note: pre-recession
output peak is 2008Q1 for euro area, Japan and UK, 2008Q2 for US.
6. A country where
employment has evolved in
a similar way to the US is
Spain, where employers
have made use of the
flexibility offered by
temporary contracts.12
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In the 2000s, households went much more into
debt in the US and the UK than in the euro area.
The contrast is striking, with the rise in household
indebtedness as a share of GDP in the US and the
UK three times larger than for the euro area – and
in 1999 the initial levels of household debt in the
euro area was already significantly smaller than
in the US.  The change in non-financial corporate
indebtedness offers a more comparable transat-
lantic picture, though the lower increase in the US
may be explained by the greater reliance on capi-
tal markets by US firms.
There are signs that the deleveraging process for
households and perhaps non-financial corpora-
tions has begun in the US, though on a limited
scale so far. It is not clear that such a process is
inevitable for the euro area as a whole – though of
course the divergences in indebtedness among
member countries are quite enormous (and
deleveraging has begun in Ireland and Spain). On
the whole, balance sheet data justifies more con-
cern about the risks of sluggish demand and
recovery in the US and the UK than in continental
Europe, while also underlining the greater unsus-
tainability of borrowing patterns in the US.
2.3 The quantitative easing debate
Whatever the US domestic debate, the rest of the
world is highly doubtful about the US Federal
Reserve programme of asset purchases (QE2).
The Europeans have been especially vocal but
there are also fears about its consequences in
Japan and the emerging world. Critics argue that
QE2 leads to the weakening of the dollar vis-à-vis
floating exchange rate countries, and to capital
Table 5: Level and changes in indebtedness (percent of GDP)
Households Non-financial corporations
US UK Euro area US UK Euro area
1999 69.0 68.5 49.5 62.8 71.6 66.9
2003 83.3 82.8 53.5 64.3 86.3 81.5
2007 96.6 98.4 61.2 74.1 106.6 90.9
2009 95.3 103.3 65.5 76.1 120.6 100.5
Change 1999-2007 27.6 30.0 11.7 11.3 35.0 24.0
Change 2007-09 -1.3 4.8 4.3 2.1 14.0 9.6
Source: Table 1 from Pisani-Ferry and Posen (2010).
outflows especially to emerging countries. Capital
flows to emerging countries either push up their
exchange rates, or, if emerging country central
banks intervene in the foreign exchange market
to resist appreciation and are not able to sterilise
the resulting money creation, inflation pressures
will raise. Inflation pressures will necessitate
interest rate hikes, thereby providing further
incentives for capital inflows.
The question is, can QE2 be characterised as
beggar-thy-neighbour? 
In a recent speech, Bernanke (2010) said that
asset purchases by the Fed are only the continu-
ation of conventional monetary policy by other
means, the difference being that they affect the
interest rates of longer maturity securities,
whereas conventional monetary policy primarily
affects the short end of the yield curve. If this def-
inition is accepted, then it follows that the crite-
rion for determining whether QE can be considered
beggar-thy-neighbour is the same as for conven-
tional monetary policy.
There is no explicit criterion for assessing the
cooperative character of monetary policy and the
resulting exchange-rate developments. There was
one in the post-war fixed exchange-rate regime as
currency devaluation was subject to the IMF and
to the scrutiny of partners. Parity adjustments
within the earlier European Monetary System were
also assessed by partners (and are still subject
to approval in the current EMR-2 system). There
was also a brief interlude in the second half of the
1980s during which the G7 targeted exchange
rate developments7. But no such criterion exists
7. From 1980-85 the US
dollar appreciated sharply
(see eg the euro/dollar real
exchange rate on Figure 4)
largely due to the Fed’s
aggressive anti-inflationary
monetary policy. On 22
September 1985 at the
Plaza Hotel in New York City,
France, Germany, Japan,
the UK and the US agreed to
coordinated central bank
intervention to depreciate
the US dollar (the ‘Plaza
Accord’). The US dollar
consequently started to
depreciate. But the speed
and the magnitude of the
dollar’s slide was seen as
excessive. Therefore, on 22
February 1987, at the
Louvre in Paris, the five
countries plus Canada
reached an agreement to
halt the decline of the US
dollar and to stabilise the
international currency
markets (the ‘Louvre
Accord’).13
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in a floating exchange rate regime based on the
principle of monetary policy autonomy. 
An implicit criterion however has emerged from
the central banks’ practice of the last two decades:
as long as monetary policy remained geared
towards price stability as usually defined – say,
an inflation objective in the 1-3 percent range – it
has been generally assessed in line with the
requirements, or at least the spirit of international
cooperation. 
If this implicit criterion is also accepted the ques-
tion becomes twofold:
• First, what does this definition become in a
context in which inflation objectives are fre-
quently undershot? If the inflation objective is,
say, two percent, but actual inflation one per-
cent for an extended period because of the
extent of economic slack, one central bank
(say, the ECB) may conclude that it has to
accept that it is temporarily unable to reach its
objective, whereas the other (say, the Fed)
may conclude that it needs to commit even
more strongly to reaching the inflation objec-
tive, possibly by adopting a price-level instead
of a price-change target. This would lead to sig-
nificant monetary policy divergence with
immediate consequences for the exchange rate
(even if these consequences would be offset
in the medium term by inflation differentials).
This is entirely a monetary policy issue that
arises from the lack of a commonly agreed def-
inition of cooperative policy in a deflationary
environment. 
• Second, is monetary policy geared towards
price stability in the medium run? This boils
down to determining if there is a risk of fiscal
dominance, ie of an unsustainable fiscal policy
ultimately leading to an irresistible pressure to
monetise the public debt. The problem here is
not the monetary policy stance itself, rather its
sustainability in the absence of a framework
guaranteeing fiscal discipline.
The exchange-rate consequences of different
monetary policy attitudes in a deflationary con-
text are limited. They may drive a temporary
depreciation of the dollar exchange rate vis-à-vis
the euro and other currencies, but they are
unlikely to result in major misalignments. For
example, the estimates presented in Neely
(2010) suggest that the Fed’s first asset-pur-
chase programme (QE1) between November
2008 and March 2009 had a cumulative down-
ward impact on the dollar of 6.5 percent against
various currencies of advanced countries. The cal-
culations of Joyce et al (2010) suggest that the
Bank of England’s asset purchase had a three per-
cent cumulative effect on the exchange rate of
sterling (four percent initial impact of which one
percent was corrected later). These estimates,
which should be cautiously assessed, do not sug-
gest that QE had a significant impact on exchange
rates. Furthermore, Neely (2010) finds that the
Fed’s QE1 did not decrease US yields only, but also
had a sizeable downward impact on yields of other
advanced countries8. And US 10-year bond yields
are not extraordinary low by international com-
parisons (Figure 7 on the next page).
At least in principle, spillovers to other advanced
countries can be limited by discussions between
central banks on the interpretation of their price
stability mandate in a deflationary context. The
more difficult issue is clearly related to increased
capital inflows to emerging countries with flexible
exchange rates and the associated problems the
inflows cause. But as we argued, the acute nature
of this issue is primarily the consequence of
asymmetric openness of emerging countries:
since some major players, such as China, retain
broad-based capital controls, capital inflows
impact those emerging countries that have more
liberalised capital accounts.
‘In principle, spillovers to advanced countries can be limited by discussions between central
banks on the interpretation of their price stability mandate in a deflationary context. More
difficult is increased capital inflows to emerging countries with flexible exchange rates.’
8. For example, he finds that
QE1 between November
2008 and March 2009
lowered US 10-year
government bond yields by
107 basis points, but at the
same time it lowered the
10-year yield in Australia by
78 basis points, in Canada
by 54 basis points, in
Germany by 50 basis
points, in Japan by 19 basis
points and in the UK by 65
basis points.14
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But the consequences of an expectation of debt
monetisation would be much more severe as its
effects would extend beyond the relatively short-
term monetary policy horizon. It would in all like-
lihood lead market participants to short the
currency, triggering a major real depreciation in
the short term. In Europe, all governments have
plans to restore budgetary sustainability. In the
US, partisan strife over budgetary policy leads to
concern that the Fed will ultimately have to inflate
the problem away, even though longer-term US
inflation expectations remain near historic lows
(Table 6). Recent reactions to fiscal consolidation
proposals9suggest that the US has got perilously
close to the ‘war of attrition’ situation once
described by Alesina and Drazen (1991). This,
more than the Fed’s stance, is the real danger.
3 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
EURO AREA
There are different elements of the currency war
dispute, which have different impacts on the
9. On 10 November 2010
the co-chairs of the
bipartisan Simpson-Bowles
Fiscal Commission
appointed by President
Obama presented
preliminary findings and
recommendations for
deficit reduction. A few days
later, on 17 November, the
Domenici-Rivlin panel
appointed by the Bipartisan
Policy Center also
presented recommend-
ations for deficit reduction.
Both sets of proposals
failed to command
consensus, on the contrary
spending cuts were flatly
rejected by senior
Democrats while tax
increases were rejected by
senior Republicans.
10. Note however that
parts, components and
semi-finished goods are a
large share of US imports
from China. An appreciation
of the renminbi against the
dollar would increase the
cost of these intermediate
inputs; therefore it is not
clear what impact a
renminbi appreciation
would have on US growth
and jobs. Using a
computational model of
global trade Francois
(2010) even concludes
that a renminbi app-
reciation or a trade war
between the US and China
would lead to US job losses,
but would improve the US
trade balance.
global economy and on Europe:
1 The most significant is the fundamental issue
of the long-term currency peg of some impor-
tant countries, most notably China.
2 There have been several recent attempts to
impact the exchange rate of countries having
floating exchange-rate regimes. 
3 The third is quantitative easing by the Federal
Reserve, the Bank of England and the Bank of
Japan.
We are concerned about the first element of cur-
rency war for three reasons:
1 First, while estimates of equilibrium exchange
rates from different models vary widely, the
typical result shows undervaluation of the
Chinese renminbi. This by itself would justify
some nominal appreciation and will lead to
gradual real appreciation through higher
Chinese inflation if the nominal exchange rate
is kept stable10. 
Table 6: US inflation expectations (percent)
Jan
2007
July
2007
Jan
2008
July
2008
Jan
2009
July
2009
Jan
2010
July
2010
Nov
2010
1 year 2.7 2.6 2.5 3.0 0.5 1.6 1.7 1.0 1.4
10 years 2.5 2.6 2.2 2.3 1.6 2.0 2.0 1.7 1.5
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. Note: See the description of the methodology in Haubrich (2009).
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Figure 7: 10-year benchmark bond yields, 3 January 2005 - 29 November 2010
Source: Datastream.15
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2 Second, the crisis impacted emerging and
advanced countries in an asymmetric way.
Non-European emerging countries were not hit
much by the crisis, while advanced countries
suffered much more. In advanced countries,
private deleveraging and public consolidation
are likely to continue to represent a drag on
domestic demand. This fundamental asymme-
try will need to be compensated for by some
form of adjustment in relative prices, even
though exports from the block of advanced
countries to the block of emerging countries
still represent only a small share of GDP11. The
real effective exchange rate of emerging coun-
tries sharply depreciated after the collapse of
Lehman Brothers and so far it has reverted to
its pre-Lehman level. But further adjustment
may be needed and there is also an asymme-
try within the emerging country group: while
China and some Middle Eastern countries peg
their currencies to the US dollar, which is weak-
ening partly due to US monetary policy, emerg-
ing countries with floating exchange rates and
open capital accounts have to face increasing
capital inflows. With a view to economic growth
and competitiveness relative to China, many of
these countries would like to resist capital
inflows by employing various policy actions,
which have led their participation in the second
form of currency war.
3 There is a risk that the US may retaliate against
Chinese currency fixity with tariffs and possi-
ble other trade measures, which may give rise
to the adoption of protectionist measures else-
where in the world as well. The experience of
the 1930s suggests that this would prolong
economic stagnation.
We are less worried about the second and third ele-
ments of currency war, even though about 20 float-
ing exchange rate countries have adopted measures
to resist currency appreciation or weaken their
currencies, indicating that the ‘war’ is widespread.
The US and the UK implemented quantitative
easing primarily for domestic policy purposes and
not with the prime purpose of influencing the
exchange rate: although we do not deny that they
may adversely impact other countries, our
assessment is that at present these policy meas-
ures remain broadly in line with domestic eco-
nomic developments. As observed by Eichengreen
(2010), simultaneous monetary easing by quan-
titative easing and unsterilised foreign exchange
intervention is not a zero-sum game and the
resulting monetary stimulus may have a positive
impact on growth, benefiting also those countries
that have not participated in this ‘war’. 
Concerning emerging countries that try to resist
capital flows, their efforts are also justified for two
main reasons: (1) quantitative easing in the US is
likely to induce capital inflows to these countries
and (2) China keeps a peg to the dollar. While a
collective appreciation of the whole emerging
country region against advanced countries may
be warranted, no emerging country would like to
appreciate against China. 
Our more benign view of these second and third
elements of currency war is also supported by
recent developments in real effective exchange
rates, which do not indicate significant impacts,
at least so far: countries participating in this war
have not achieved a marked depreciation of their
currencies and in fact most of them are still expe-
riencing appreciation. These developments sug-
gest that the weapons used to fight the war may
not be very effective in most cases.
Concerning the euro, its exchange rate has not
been impacted much by the recent ‘currency war’,
at least so far: it continues to be overvalued, but to
a lesser extent than before Lehman’s collapse. The
euro exchange rate is also significantly impacted
by market perceptions concerning the sovereign
debt crisis of some periphery euro-area members.
A sizeable depreciation of the euro earlier this year
was the result of this internal crisis and the recent
recovery of the euro can also be the consequence
of brighter market perceptions about the future of
the euro area.
The implications for Europe of the three elements
of ‘currency wars’ follow our assessments.
European policymakers should not criticise float-
11. The exports of the block
of advanced countries to all
other countries make up
7.6 percent of advanced
countries GDP, of which 2.9
percent goes to the group of
emerging countries used in
our study and 4.7 percent
to other countries. Note that
export is a gross measure
and therefore the GDP share
of added value in exports is
even lower.16
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